Generally, even if it is not said one hundred percent that the very general and unusual regulation of the so-called "exceptions" is seen and considered in this way, with a good approximation, when a Government, and moreover still in its neonatal state such as that of Giorgia Meloni (and which, therefore, should express itself in all its reformist originality), begins to want to put its hand on the constitutional reform, then, almost certainly, that same embryonic government would seem to express, in spite of itself, all its intrinsic and extrinsic weakness. Let's be clear: the circumstance, in the eyes of most, may perhaps appear almost like a paradox as underlined by many, both for reasons of a technically numerical nature expressed by the parliamentary majority, and for reasons of a relational nature, given the connection, when forced, when of pure and simple managerial opportunity, subsumed within a government plan that is probably still lacking in essential contents to be reflected externally.
However, and these first eight months of government seem to have ascertained it with symptomatic evidence, and in reality, Giorgia Meloni's right-wing government is characterized by having a very modest popular legitimacy, clearly revealed, conversely, and to tell the truth, by a certain "numerical imperfection" due to the participation in the vote of 25 September last of only a minimal fringe of Italian citizens who, with good likelihood, and with hindsight, would seem to have wanted to cast a so-called "reaction vote" with an almost punitive compared to the traditional political forces of which the executive had been composed up to that moment.
If we then wanted to reflect even just for a moment on the devastating effects that, in the absence of any appropriate corrective action, the reduction in the numbers of parliamentary representation has produced (and Sardinia has been overwhelmed in full view and considering that it will lose its own representative), then it would not even be surprising, at least in terms of the prejudice closely connected to the insufficiency of the quorum needed to proceed with the Reform.
In short, on balance, now as then, i.e. at the time of the Renzi-Boschi Reform, it is only, and mainly, the numbers that betray. In the latter case, and remembering it does no harm, the reform proposal, hard fought by the then parliamentary opposition and not only, had met with a pale approval expressed with the votes of a majority of less than two thirds of the members of each chamber, and consequently, as prescribed by article 138 of the Constitution, the coveted provision could not be promulgated directly but, rather, be subjected to a popular referendum whose results, for better or for worse, are extremely well known to all and have marked the political ascent of its proponents is indelible.











