According to what has been learned from the news from the major news agencies, it would seem that Maria Elisabetta Alberta Casellati , following the leaked indiscretions about her ministerial reform activity, has clarified that " she will never void the prerogatives of the Head of State ".
The current contingency, the socio-economic needs, the announced difficulties of a budget law that already promises to be "prudent", would seem to contribute to making the discussion on the so-called "premiere" (improperly said) completely extemporaneous . And probably as such it can well be perceived by the majority of the associates.
But, beyond the indiscretions and the consequent clarifications, even if we want to disregard the probably inopportune timing of a constitutional reform which would be far-reaching, and which, as such, would need not only to be submitted to a popular referendum to compulse the real will of the Italians on the point (as well as their specific interest in the matter due to the "prerogatives" of a political and legal nature under discussion), and also wanting to ignore the contingent need, but also the future one, of a reform of such consistency that to date it would not seem to have been disclosed with determination, clarity and transparency, what would be its concrete relevance precisely in terms of government dynamics? What would be the compelling reason, and not otherwise extendable, which would impose the discussion in the short term, admitted and perhaps not granted that the topic interests civil society called today to address the needs of everyday life? Would it really be possible, alias compatible with our constitutional system, even before being useful (and it would be necessary to establish for whom it would actually be useful and to remedy what) a model of "premierato" even if "Italianized" in tricolor sauce? Also because, don't forget, it would be necessary (and this is said only and solely on the argumentative level since the theme has returned to the fore) to agree (and so to speak) on the correct identification of the constitutional mechanisms through which to conform and substantiate the so-called government structure. And not only that, assuming and not assuming that an operation of this kind is already easy to carry out, given that, in the hypothesis, it would be necessary to pay attention, and not only attention, to the balance of power between political parties in consideration of their new strengthened role, but also, and consequently, to the dynamics of internal selection of potential candidates who would primarily derive their legitimacy from that same choice. All without considering, and one could not even ignore it, that the mechanism for strengthening the institutions involved, i.e. governors, who would be responsible for achieving the unity and efficiency of government action, should correspond, in a subtle amount very certain counter-balance of counterweight, the simultaneous and essential strengthening of all the so-called guarantee institutions.











