July 30th and 31st were particularly complex days in terms of migration. Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in North Africa (which is not part of the Schengen Area under similar conditions to mainland Spain), saw the entry of approximately sixty thousand migrants from Morocco in just twenty-four hours.
It's true that the emergency appears to have subsided quickly thanks to the agreed-upon repatriation of the large influx of people. But the Italian government and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's reaction was swift, announcing the reinstatement of sea and air border controls with Spain. This measure has been improperly described as a "suspension of the Schengen Agreement." However, regardless of the propaganda that would seem to underlie such an intransigent stance, the point seems to be entirely different: given Ceuta's unquestionable geographic location in North Africa, what practical use could there be, in the current situation, in the idea of stopping the potential arrival of migrants from Spain by reinstating border controls with that country? Especially since Spain, notoriously, doesn't even directly border Italy. Let's be clear: is there really a serious threat to public order or internal security as a result of the events in Ceuta? Is this a truly necessary and proportionate measure? It probably wouldn't seem so, even if we were to take any prudential considerations into account. And it's not strictly necessary to "sympathize" with Sanchez or the "left" in general to appreciate the situation with due objectivity. Perhaps a look at a map is enough.
The "suspension of Schengen," to use the term loosely, is nothing new in the history of the Union, and there are several examples, even recent ones, which, however, do not seem to have been given the same emphasis as during the G7, G8, and G20 summits. So why has the Ceuta case triggered such a strong and impactful reaction, at least symbolically, from the Italian government? Perhaps (the doubtful formula is inescapable) simply because the country involved is Spain, led by Pedro Sanchez, who has distinguished himself in Europe for his fierce opposition to Donald Trump. It could be: after all, it's a sin to think the worst, but it's always right. It should not be forgotten that Pedro Sanchez, effectively Giorgia Meloni's (one might say) staunch opponent in Europe, has built much of his public image by positioning himself as a leader who guarantees respect for international law against any automatic adherence to Washington's initiatives.
And perhaps because, with the upcoming general election approaching and the more or less evident friction within the majority coalition, Brothers of Italy feels the need to reassert their leadership with greater determination. Anything is possible, and the range of hypotheses is broad. However, beyond any undoubtedly relevant political considerations, the overall situation should prompt careful reflection on the repercussions within Europe and beyond that the Ceuta case could have. Put another way: any tension within the European system weakens its institutions and thus their diplomatic strength in relations outside the European Union, especially with Donald Trump's America, which stands to gain everything from the Old Continent's political, economic, and military weakness, given the "redefinition," so to speak, of the terms of an alliance different from the one the European Union had settled for. This means that remaining united, cohesive, and compact is the only response to any crisis, both internal and external.
Giuseppina Di Salvatore