While Ursula von der Leyen, in her capacity as president of the European Commission, seems overwhelmed (so to speak) by an episode of dialectical "bulimia" when she tries to reassure President Volodymyr Zelensky, albeit with evident embarrassment she cannot say how , on the upcoming annexation of Ukraine to the European Union, meanwhile, on the Italian front, Mario Draghi, no less prodigal in terms of expression, had already made it legitimate, in recent days, to ridicule, or almost, the serious economic crisis in progress bringing it back to the same level as a choice between the "air conditioner turned on" in the summer and the pursuit of peace on an international level in the conscious uncertainty of both the "an" and the "when". Without, however, considering, both one and the other, from the top of their institutional position, that every form of petty and impromptu idealism not only represents a luxury reserved for those who have a "swollen wallet" and a "full belly" , but it also constitutes a useless (and probably offensive) rhetorical speculative exercise for those, most of whom, are forced to meticulously monetize the newspaper to be able to make ends meet.
But, beyond any obvious consideration on the (in) opportunity of declarations of such consistency, are we really sure that the annexation of Ukraine to the European Union is the most appropriate choice? Are we sure that the enlargement to the east of Europe has not constituted, and does not continue to constitute, a bankruptcy enterprise to be put an end to once and for all? Let's be clear: the fact of asking oneself questions does not necessarily have to perplex consciences and / or, worse, result in any form of historical ostracism. Nor is it a reflection of a selfishly understood nationalist mood. Far from it. Rather, it is a question of reflecting on the fact that certain "blocks", even though now non-existent on a physical and naturalistic level, continue to survive, more or less unconsciously, in the intimacy of the populations directly concerned, and continue to be reflected on a strictly geopolitical level. conditioning it.
First of all, because the entry into Europe of the countries of the so-called "Visegrad Group", namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, if, on the one hand, it seems to have favored the progress of the public institutions of direct reference, on the other hand it does not he managed to favorably condition the process of evolution in the liberal sense that one would have expected. Therefore, because those "alternative democracies" (if the expression may be allowed), inserted "sic et simpliciter" in the European context, seem to have wanted and been able to find only a political-representative outlet of a markedly populist and extremist mold, not inclined to the same, to favor the opening of their borders and to pursue guidelines of shared acceptance as a broad expression of a reinforced socialism that probably never existed. Finally, because, notoriously, for the Eastern countries on the border between the Western and Eastern world, entry into the Union, rather than sharing principles and values inspired by high forms of pure democratic constitutionalism, has translated, and continues to translate into an undeniable advantage of an economic nature, especially in the short and immediate terms of the acquisition of useful resources to favor its development and growth.
This being the case, and it is almost undeniable that they are, do we really want to recognize the Eastern countries any role in the process of European strengthening and (re) construction and in the opposing resistance to Vladimir Putin? We are really sure that the "force of arms" (and the question applies to all leaders "in the field" in the current war context, from Vladimir Putin to Volodymyr Zelensky and to those in the West who are interested in participating "by proxy" almost as if to express before the world a centralism drastically lost in the years of the post "Cold War") - to use the words of the philosopher John Locke - could coincide, in the medium and long term, with the "consent of the people" deprived of their land and their homes? The answer is, as always, self-evidently consequent, and does not even need further clarification. The error on which we continue to stumble completely regardless of the teachings of past and recent history is that of claiming to bring the Russian-Ukrainian conflict back into the ideological contraposition between an advanced form of liberal Atlanticism (anachronistic if compared to contemporary social transformations ) and an equally disruptive one of revolutionary socialism (supplanted today by the militaristic nationalism of the new Putinian era) that neither the United States nor Russia are today able to personify.
Perhaps the time has come to redesign the "areas of influence" of the world that the process of globalization has contributed to making fluid and uncertain, relegating Europe to a marginal role on the economic level but strategic on the militaristic one. For this reason, the Union itself, far from uncritically embracing expansionist policies capable of upsetting the already delicate international equilibrium, should begin to reason and act autonomously, looking at its own specific interest beyond and beyond any pro-Atlanticist or thread-based inspiration. - Muscovite, in the awareness of being "other", both from one and from the other. In other words, the real problem of the contingent geopolitical context is the lack of useful alternatives to the two traditional models: the latter circumstance which, on the one hand, has allowed China to impose itself on international markets by attracting its interests, on the other hand, he ended up relegating Europe to a pure and simple link between two opposing “worlds”.
Russia's relations with the United States on the one hand and with the European Union on the other seem to have reached the most critical phase since the end of the Cold War for two reasons. The first can be traced back to a relationship of energy dependence which over the years has guaranteed a certain political stability to Moscow. The second is attributable to the inability of the Western world (if we still want to make use of this opposition in linguistic terms) to develop acceptable relational strategies with Russia capable of guaranteeing not only a stable collaboration aimed at combating rampant terrorism, but also to contain the temptation , ever present and prevailing, to affiliate the former Soviet republics to the Euro-Atlantic community. Once again it is necessary to decide, and once and for all, which side to take. Once again it is a question of understanding what potential European "centralism" has and whether it can survive autonomously in the context that still sees two opposing, and completely anachronistically, two blocs: the Western and the Eastern ones. We are full stop.
Giuseppina Di Salvatore
(Lawyer - Nuoro)
