“Our priority is to end the war,” Volodymyr Zelensky said, adding that he was “ready to negotiate directly with Putin to end the war,” “rather than standing in line and waiting for everyone to resolve the world’s conflicts, and then it’s their turn.”
Clear words, of course, which, all things considered, a full four years after the conflict began, appear to have no decisive impact and/or effective force. Rather, they seem to reflect the idea of something coming from afar, from a context no longer current and pressing. And perhaps, precisely between the lines of those words, one could read a deep concern for the "harm" (if one may use the expression) suffered (if indeed it had been suffered) due to the West's commitment against Iran, which, essentially, would divert US weapons toward the Persian Gulf, so to speak. For his part, and conversely, Vladimir Putin appears to have expressed his willingness to recognize the European Union's role in resolving the conflict, on the understanding that such "assistance should be part of the Anchorage agreements." Moreover, Vladimir Putin himself has clarified that he is not "against Ukraine's accession to the EU, but... against the EU becoming a military bloc." In short, nothing new under the sun.
To be more specific, from a purely economic perspective, Kiev's accession to the European Union would likely be burdensome for Italy and its primary sector, as it would be an agricultural competitor that would attract European funding for the sector. Furthermore, from another and different perspective, the European Union, at present, does not represent a single entity, and this condition inherently "hampers" any initiative that, if actually undertaken, is intended as an initiative of individual Member States, binding only on those Member States.
It's no coincidence that Italy was absent from the London meeting between Starmer, Macron, Merz, and Zelensky, given its veto on sending troops to conflict zones. Whether this absence will result in damage to its international prestige is difficult to say today, but in fact, that very absence marks a profound fracture within the Union, which cannot help but be severely weakened, not so much by its natural inclination toward non-belligerence, but rather by the evident lack of a cohesive organizational structure capable of dictating a single, binding guideline for all twenty-seven member states.
Italy, rightfully so, suffers all the difficulties of its hybrid international positioning, as it is "conditioned" (if one may use the expression) by the current government's ideological closeness to Donald Trump's policies and its continued support for Kiev, in line with the Biden administration. Perhaps it would have been more consistent with the national interest to maintain a neutral stance while assuming a consistent diplomatic commitment, which would have guaranteed it greater negotiating influence. This has not been the case. With the change in leadership at the White House, and with it, inevitably, the order of priorities, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with the resulting serious global energy crisis, currently represents the major international emergency, leaving behind every other geopolitical issue, including Kiev. It is time for change, and Italy, even before the European Union, and even before its own potential European allies, does not appear prepared to address it and/or address it with the necessary force. If it must be in the national interest, then let it be so in every way.
Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro
