Officially, it should ensure a formalized framework of stable, continuous and structural intervention, for cooperation in the context of relations between the two signatory countries, on a par with the Elysée and Aachen treaties which, at the time, had stigmatized the essential terms. of Franco-German cooperation. Again officially, it should ensure to Italy the acquisition of an important position in the context of the privileged relationship, and so far only bivalent, already existing between France and Germany. Again officially, such a strengthened agreement, so to speak, should help to counterbalance, in Europe, the weight of Germany, too often supported by the so-called “frugal four” in the implementation of “austere” policies in terms of economic and social rights.
The reality, however, would seem, as in fact it is preparing to be, like anything else. If only for the fact of not being able to achieve anything that in practice despite having been greeted with great favor by the "naive", or perhaps "hypocrites", of the law and of the supra-national context of immediate reference. Meanwhile, because France and Italy, that is, more correctly, Emmanuel Macron and Sergio Mattarella for having been Mario Draghi a pure and simple appearance of circumstance having a formalistic nature and function of representation, have failed in what should have been a burden on them. they only burdened, ie the burden of extending the binding effects of that agreement to Germany in its recognized and undisputed role of "Pilot Country", thus remaining destined, by mistake and / or by subtle and opportunistic determination, "to make the accounts "always and in any case with a very little accommodating" Innkeeper "as a necessary contradictor but still" pactum solutus ".
So, because, with all due respect to the "naive" and / or "hypocrites" mentioned above, far from being able to qualify in the reductive terms of any "forgetfulness", the failure to include Germany in the context of an agreement that would like to redesign the map of the balance of power within the Union, seems to have been directly desired and, to be malicious, intentionally deliberated, precisely by the highest Franco-German exponents, and precisely to avert the risk of constraint deriving from the consequent observance and / or even only tacit tolerance of the Franco-Italian "minor" Entente, which, with good verisimilitude, would seem preordained to ensure France, and therefore Emmanuel Macron, a greater space for intervention in the context of relations with Germany itself, its historical "Beloved enemy". Finally, because on balance, and also to want to grant everything, this "Strengthened Agreement" ends up only by harnessing Italy, making it a harmless partner and (in) directly dependent on the Franco-German "major" Agreement in the articulated dynamics of relations within the Union as a legal and social entity considered as a whole. In short, we ran into "happily ever after", and for the umpteenth time, in a "cul de sac": we had the opportunity to contribute to the change of community structures and we ended up confirming and strengthening the usual Franco-German axis. The more the months pass, the more it seems to reveal itself, and I dutifully and respectfully reiterate the "seems", the weft of the embroidery created and wanted by President Sergio Matterella through the creation of a Government of National Unity led by Mario Draghi directly wanted by him and solicited, as a decisive figure in the European context, whose aims would have been from the beginning, and perhaps, should have been "other" than those announced. Let's be clear: it is not a question of sterile skepticism, nor of an uncritical spirit of contestation, since any evaluation in this regard could have been of the opposite sign if it had taken part in this Strengthened Understanding and / or Treaty of Rome and / or, if you prefer, also Germany by signing it / or for acceptance. This was not the case. In short, let's face it clearly and without hypocrisy of circumstance: if together with Paris and Berlin, Rome could have supported a leadership within the European Union to oppose the blockade of the Visegrad countries and the so-called Frugals (very close friends of Germany, moreover) in the 'explanation of the political issues of the most sensitive interest (ie migration and those relating to the stability pact), together with Paris and Rome alone, is instead relegated to the rank of "crutch" to reinforce the former to be used if necessary to the detriment of Berlin and its crown of "received" and "pretentious" statelets.
