From the Via della Seta to the Via dei Trasvolatori, on the banks of the Pond of Santa Gilla, in the aerial enclave of the Golfo degli Angeli, the step is short. What we are about to tell you is the silent story of an invisible red thread and a contract that is as unknown as it is controversial. It is the landing, among the jet and boeing runways, of the long economic hand, and not only, of the Chinese Communist Party that bursts fully into the heart of the cyber security of Cagliari airport. The journey is long, but the landing is documented. In recent days, between Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve, the all-Chinese operation secretly went through with a lot of haste and urgency. The new Chinese "radioactive" devices to rummage through the departing suitcases have conquered the sub-level of the Cagliari airport. A full-blown blitz, triggered after the investigation by the Sardinian Union on safety and a thousand vicissitudes of a contract that had never been successful after two years. After all, behind that Chinese brand there is much more than a scanner factory located as a Trojan horse in eastern Poland. It is the names and surnames that turn on the red light on the security case of the Sardinian airport. A state affair and much more.
The prince of Peking
The surname is Hu, the name Haifeng. In his native land he is "the little prince", a name reserved only for the firstborn of the highest offices of the impenetrable Chinese Communist regime. Born in 1972, computer scientist by profession, none other than the son of Hu Jintao, the former general secretary of the Communist Party and President of the People's Republic of China. They say everything and more about him, from a “prince of Teflon”, for his characteristic of making himself invisible, to a rising star ready to climb the peaks of the National People's Congress to succeed directly to the maximum leader Xi Jinping. Yet this fifty-year-old career, already fully entered into the leadership of the Party-State, has not always devoted himself to politics in the strict sense, quite the contrary. To find out its true story it is useless to turn to Chinese information sources, the answer is always the same: "Following the laws in force, certain information will not be shown." After all, its rise is entirely linked to the new "digital era" put in black and white by the Chinese regime: to become the first totalitarian superpower in the world based on technology. It is no coincidence, in fact, that Hu Haifeng (pictured) was in fact the inspirer and president of Nuctech, a Chinese giant with digital eyes focused on everything that moves in the world, from airports to ports, from railway wagons at industrial yards. A sort of world “big brother” managed directly by Beijing, with technologies that are beyond the control of anyone, including states that source their supplies from Chinese industry. It is under his leadership that Nuctech plans the European landing in the heart of Karol Wojtyla's land, in that Warsaw, where Solidarity's lesson does not seem to have breached the Chinese work ethic. For the son of the Chinese elite, there were not many ways to break through Europe's trade wall. The only way to land in the West, and get their hands on the security system of ports and airports, was to establish "his" border factory in a European country with the cost of labor closest to that of China.
The Chinese horse
Poland was, in the Beijing algorithms, the Trojan horse for landing in Europe. An apparently European factory, built, however, with money and technology made in China. The goal was to produce in Europe the large scanners for shipping, containers and railway wagons, for baggage and metal detectors for airports. An operation, however, not only industrial and economic. Among the unspeakable aspirations is that of putting citizens and places under control, sensitive data and privacy. The rise of the scion to the top of Chinese society, and its Polish branch, are a boost to business that leaves no stone unturned: after Hu became president of the company, the communist central authorities, in fact, entrusted Nuctech with a unprecedented quasi-monopoly control over the gold market for the sale of security equipment at airports in China. That industrial climb, digital and not only, earned him the promotion to secretary of the Communist Party, the same that controls Tsinghua Holdings, the leader of at least 20 large companies including "his" Nuctech. The economic challenge of the scanner and security factory, however, does not seem to enjoy the wind in its sails if at the beginning of 2020 the assets wing of the very powerful China National Nuclear Corporation had to take the field, under the direct supervision of state properties. Thus, a full-fledged industry in the elite of the Party-State companies, with one mission above all: to indoctrinate world security, to put it under control, from airports to ports, from embassies to railway stations. When the Chinese nuclear company is about to enter Sardinia, however, no one notices anything.
The Sardinian contract
The contract for 5 x-ray apparatuses for the airports of Cagliari and Olbia was banned in an anomalous manner two years ago. It is the airport of Cagliari, through Sogaer, which publishes the tender also in the name and on behalf of Geasar, the airport of Olbia Costa Smeralda. The award is ratified on the 11th of December 2019. Nuctech Warsaw Company Limited of Warsaw wins, basically the Chinese dressed as Poles. The estimate of the contract for those 5 devices is a staggering figure: 10 million euros. The tender report is a mathematical formula, parameters, certifications, reaction times and efficiency ratings. In the end, the victory is awarded to the Chinese. Forgive the Americans and the British. The judgment of the competition commission, however, is contradicted. Alan Leighton Mixer, an American from Washington, legal representative of Rapiscan Systems, writes to Massimo Rodriguez, head of the tender process for Sogaer. The disputes are an encyclopedia.
The American accusations
In the US letter, no half-words are used: "Without entering the discretion of the technical commission, we note that some considerations relating to the quality of the technology resulting in a very high quality of the images produced, such as the absence of afterglow phenomena have been completely ignored in the attribution of qualitative evaluation ". As if to say: the clarity of the X-ray images is insignificant for the score. The Yankees then tackle the issue of explosives, a weak link in the airport security chain as demonstrated by the investigation by the Sardinian Union on the ENAC report on security. And they don't go down lightly.
Explosives and forgetfulness
The accusation is substantiated: at stake are the homemade explosives, equal to those 14 escaped in a single day at the security checks in the Cagliari airport on that black day in August. The Americans with a European base in London write: "With regard to the awarding recognition of the HME (Home Made Explosives) detection, improvised explosives, it should be noted that this characteristic is common to all competitors as it is a minimum requirement for obtaining EDS certification Std 3. Assigning a rewarding judgment to a single participant for a characteristic inherent in the technology certified by ECAC for all competitors is detrimental to all those who have the same certified ability ». In practice, according to the Washington competitors, the score awarded only the Chinese when the requirement was, instead, compulsorily in possession of all the competitors. And then there are the disputes regarding safety at work. The Chinese claim to have the OHSAS 18001 certificate, the one, to be clear, relating to international standards for occupational health and safety management systems. Too bad, the Americans write, that there is no trace of that certificate and that the contracting authority has not asked for justification. Indeed, according to the US letter, the commission also attributes another point in favor to the Chinese. Sogaer will never respond to disputes. Days, weeks, months and even years go by: there is no trace of those machines made in Polish China at the Cagliari-Elmas airport.
The Christmas present
Until last Christmas Eve. The photo we publish attests the landing and installation of the first Chinese machinery in the basement of the airport. Quick replacement of American cars, and assembly, first of one and then of the other of Chinese-Polish production. A two-year darkness, from the awarding of the tender, was December 2019, to the installation of these days. An inexplicable silence. Behind that delay, however, there is much more than a simple bureaucratic problem. The deal is of the state, of the heavy ones. At stake is none other than the United States Department of Commerce and Security. It is December 22, 2020 when the Federal Register nails down the Chinese factory in the land of Poland. The tender in Sardinian sauce, the one that will open the doors to the Chinese of Nuctech, has just turned one year without anything having moved. The Americans convene the ERC, a super security committee where the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy and the Treasury sit. To be decided is the inclusion in the list of companies subject to trade restrictions none other than the Chinese giant that a year earlier had been awarded the supply of X-ray scanners for the airports of Cagliari and Olbia: Nuctech. The Chinese end up on the "Entity List", a trade restriction list reserved for "State Department sanctioned activities contrary to US national security and / or foreign policy interests."
The aut aut of the USA
The verdict is very heavy (pictured): «The Committee has decided to add Tongfang Technology Ltd. (Chinese name of NucTech) to the restriction list for its involvement in activities contrary to the national security interests of the United States. Specifically, the Committee determined that NucTech's low-performance equipment hinders US efforts to counter international trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. With less performing equipment it means less rigorous control of cargo screening, increasing the risk of proliferation ». The American agencies do not stop and write a report reserved for allied governments, the Italian one first: stop the landing in Europe of Nuctech products, stating that the baggage scanning systems at western gateways represent a threat to security and western businesses.
We speak Chinese
Leading the assault are the US National Security Council and US agencies. The goal is to eradicate Nuctech from Europe. Washington officials are certain: any connected device could transmit sensitive passenger data such as travel history and shipping data to Chinese spies via a backdoor in the screening technology. In the Santa Gilla airport, however, not too many problems have arisen: since Christmas the security of the Cagliari airport speaks Chinese.
(10.continue)