Why is there a need for a new electoral law? Why change the rules of the game if even the current government is defined by its own leaders in terms of stability? Why now, with appropriate corrections, after more than twenty years, propose the method, already tested in 2005 with the Porcellum law, of resorting at the end of the legislature to an electoral system that the majority hopes will better suit its interests, allowing it to triumph once again in the next elections?
Don't be too concerned: perhaps, simply because the much-coveted victory might not be perceived as certain. And perhaps, because the margin of failure might be too high to risk everything without taking timely action. Perhaps. Who knows. Moreover, it might not be superfluous to note, generally speaking, that the change to the electoral system occurs through an ordinary law producing constitutional effects: that is, a law that the current political majority can approve, so to speak, autonomously. The more malicious would like to see this move as a sign of significant weakness in the current governing majority, which, all things considered, might not be as diverse and unified as it has always claimed. Moreover, given an increasingly precarious and uncertain international landscape (and especially faced with an increasingly unpredictable and, in some respects, unreliable ally like Donald Trump), which has not failed, and continues to have a negative impact on the domestic market, weighing heavily on citizens' pockets and, consequently, on their shopping carts, it is highly likely that the general election will be held in the spring of 2027, with rules circumscribed by a text to be approved quickly by the summer. It would seem that, precisely through an electoral law, the aim is to bring back through the window what was already out the door. Worded differently and perhaps more clearly.
The Melonellum, as it has been defined, requires each coalition to nominate the person they intend to propose as Prime Minister. To put it even more clearly, it will not be a matter of nominating a mere political "leader," as was previously the case with the Porcellum electoral system, but rather the actual candidate to lead the government. Such a "modus procedendi," admitted but perhaps not conceded, that could pass constitutional scrutiny, will inevitably have a decisive impact on the very form of parliamentary government, effectively modifying the government formation process by limiting the President of the Republic's powers in this area, which were already conditioned by the awarding of the majority bonus, redefined as "governability." The anomaly would appear to lie precisely in the legal requirement to indicate, when submitting lists or coalitions, the name of the candidate for the office of Prime Minister. In other words, the anomaly would appear to consist in the anticipated timing of a circumstance that should only become relevant once the various parties in the field have won a majority of seats. At this point, some reflections are warranted, at least to try to understand whether, at this time, electoral law is a priority for Italians. This is especially true given that the Meloni Government, as the current Prime Minister has often emphasized, was formed following the clear victory of the center-right coalition in the general elections of September 25, 2022, effectively establishing itself as the first parliamentary majority to emerge directly from the ballot box since 2008. And even more so when that same parliamentary majority has made popular consensus a strength. So, why change an electoral system that, overall, works? Why change the rules of democratic representation in the absence of real parliamentary convergence?
Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro
